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Abstract—This study examined the degree to which paranormal believ-
ers, who profess ‘strong’ belief in the popular expression of a topic known 
as the primary item (e.g., Psychics possess a mysterious ability to know things 
about a person’s past and future), disagree with related items and/or the 
putative ‘cause’ of the topic, known as secondary items (e.g., Some people 
have a mysterious ability to accurately predict such things as natural disasters, 
election results, political assassinations, etc.). It was theorized that scoring 
diff erences between primary and secondary items might indicate certain 
kinds of paranormal believer, which might then allow us to conduct deeper 
analyses of paranormal belief (PB) and its putative relationships with defi -
cits and dysfunctions. A complete set of items drawn from ten established 
PB scales was administered to a sample of 343 respondents. Using Factor 
Analysis, we developed the Paranormal Belief Informedness Scale (PBIS), 
consisting of 10 primary items, and 10 secondary items, scores of which 
were used to identify three major PB types: ‘primary believers’ (who believe 
in all 10 primary items, and thus exhibit ‘strong’ PB), ‘primary non-believers’ 
(who believe in none of the 10 primary items), and ‘mixed believers’ (who 
believe in only some primary items). We found signifi cant response-rate 
diff erences between primary and secondary items across believer types, 
and across psi categories (i.e. extra-sensory perception, psychokinesis, and 
life after death). For the full sample, it was shown that there is a signifi cant 
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relationship between PB and reality testing defi cits as measured on the re-
ality testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality Organisation (IPO-RT) 
(Lenzenweger et al. 2001). However, this relationship tended not to be sig-
nifi cant across believer types. Also, there was no evidence in the full sample, 
or in any believer type, that PB was correlated with depression as measured 
on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II). We suggest that paranormal be-
lievers have diff erences that may be refl ected in their responses to predictor 
variables, and/or how informed their paranormal belief is.
Keywords: depression—informed belief—paranormal belief—quasi-belief 
—primary belief—reality testing
Introduction
The literature suggests that people who believe in, and/or claim, paranormal 
experiences, as measured on a range of paranormal belief (PB) scales, 
can be seen as potentially ‘defi cient’ or ‘dysfunctional’ (see Irwin 2009 
for a thorough review). These conditions can be characterized under two 
clinically oriented hypotheses: (i) the cognitive defi cits hypothesis—
believers have uncritical, naïve, or irrational thought processes based on 
defi cits in intelligence and/or reasoning skills, and (ii) the psychodynamic 
functions hypothesis, whereby believers are psychologically disadvantaged 
or maladapted (Irwin 2009, Irwin & Watt 2007). While some concessions 
have been made that the fi ndings for cognitive defi cits in paranormal 
believers are “mixed,” “ambiguous,” or “unequivocal” (Irwin & Watt 
2007:229–231), or even “not encouraging” (Irwin 2009:90), and it has been 
proposed that PB might logically stem from “the data of parapsychological 
research” (Irwin & Watt 2007:232), there is, however, “general support” 
(Irwin & Watt 2007:234) that believers tend to be psychologically or 
socially deviant (dysfunctional). We would argue that the pathologization 
of paranormal believers, although warranted in some cases, has somehow 
become overextended to all paranormal believers, and much of the past 
research in anomalistic psychology is a primary infl uence in this assumption. 
On the psychodynamic aspects of PB, Jinks (2012a) has identifi ed some 
specifi c sources of this assumption:
. . . it is the associating of paranormal belief formation and maintenance 
with schizotypal ideation (Brugger et al. 1993, Brugger & Graves 1997, Her-
govich, Schott, & Arendasy 2008, Irwin & Green 1998, Pizzagalli et al. 2000, 
Pizzagalli, Lehmann, & Brugger 2001, Thalbourne, Dunbar, & Delin 1995, 
Windholz & Diamant 1974), delusion, psychosis, and schizophrenia (e.g., 
Cella, Vellante, & Preti 2012, Houran & Lange 2004, Thalbourne 1994) that 
most successfully creates an impression that paranormal believers are psy-
chologically dysfunctional. (Jinks 2012a:128)
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We do not entirely dispute the insights drawn from some correlates 
and functions of PB (see Irwin & Watt 2007, Kumar & Pekala 2001, 
Lange & Houran 1997, 1998), and it is clear that many psi-researchers 
place great emphasis and importance on PB scales for scientifi c reasons—
for example, due to the often-supported psi and sheep–goat hypotheses,1 
sheep are usually regarded as probable high-scorers on tests of psychic 
ability whereas goats are not (see Lawrence 1993, Palmer 1971, 1977). 
PB scores are therefore good predictors of a range of psychological and 
parapsychological responses. However, a number of PB scales have been 
criticized (see Irwin’s 2009 review), and only in the last few decades have 
psychometric procedures reached the level of sophistication where PB has 
shifted from a unitary construct to a multi-factorial construct. It is now 
taken for granted that PB can refer not only to beliefs in (a) psychic abilities 
such as extra-sensory perception and psychokinesis, but also beliefs in 
(b) supernatural, occult, and crypto-morphic phenomena. These advances 
are noteworthy, but they do not resolve a critical problem—namely, that 
participants in PB studies merely tend to accept at face value most belief-
scale items as either ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ (Walton 2010). Such acceptance 
fails to address the possibility that some believers per se might ‘believe’ in 
concepts they do not actually understand, even though those beliefs do not 
correspond to informed beliefs, or the type of beliefs PB researchers believe 
they are measuring. Rather, these ‘believers’ may hold quasi-beliefs—semi-
propositional representations of the world superfi cially believed to be true 
prior to any truth evaluation (Recanati 1997).2 Individuals may often hold 
quasi-beliefs indefi nitely, never migrating them to the status of an informed 
belief, casually expressing agreement with a given proposition in such a way 
that their answer is indistinguishable from another individual who is better 
informed (see Jinks 2012a for details).3 We note the fact that a person’s level 
of paranormal belief is underpinned by how informed their belief is as much 
as how informed their non-belief, or disbelief, is. However, for the purposes 
of this study (and for operational reasons), we are mainly interested in 
informed belief; not informed non-belief (i.e. informed skepticism).
Without a clearer understanding of the nature and diversity of PB 
(i.e. the qualitative, not just quantitative, degrees to which these beliefs 
are held and maintained), the proposition that PB indicates defi cits and/or 
dysfunctions may likely be unwarranted, or at the very least may not apply 
to some subsets of paranormal believers.
Primary and Secondary Paranormal Belief Items
A viable means of investigating quasi-belief, and other forms of belief, is to 
develop question sets with two classes of item. Items in the fi rst class would 
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replicate most of the familiar propositions found in common paranormal 
belief questionnaires referring to anomalous processes, occurrences, 
locations, entities, or personalities. Such items could be labelled primary 
items. Items in the second class would variously (a) represent the standard 
anomalous explanations for the primary items; (b) offer an alternative 
example of the primary item; or (c) re-word the primary item to exclude 
specifi c reference to any anomalous process, occurrence, location, entity, or 
associated personality. Such items could be labeled secondary items.
Jinks (2012a) developed a set of primary and secondary items about 
a number of paranormal and related beliefs, and then administered them 
to more than 400 participants. He confi rmed, for example, that those who 
held ‘strong’ beliefs in primary items (e.g., “Some places are haunted by 
the ghosts of dead people”) actually displayed erratic patterns of approval 
toward related secondary items (e.g., “When people die, part of them still 
remains on earth in another form”) (Jinks 2012a:141). Those participants 
who responded affi rmatively to a given primary item, and their related 
secondary item(s) because they possess greater knowledge of the topic 
(i.e. they are better informed) were referred to as ‘informed believers,’ and 
those who responded affi rmatively to the primary item only were referred 
to as ‘quasi-believers.’ Jinks concluded that the latter group might hold only 
superfi cial understanding of what they claim to believe. It may even be the 
case that the associations between disorders/dysfunctions and paranormal 
belief might be more a function of a propensity to hold quasi-beliefs, rather 
than the fact that these beliefs refer to extraordinary content.
Houran and Lange (2012) argued that Jinks’ method had merit and 
could be applied to PB “scales that have been validated” (p. 161), a 
recommendation supported by Jinks (2012b). We argue that none of the 
established PB scales, as currently used, differentiate between informed 
believers and quasi-believers, though opportunity may be there in the 
pools of approved items to discern the hypothesized difference. From that 
perspective, it is possible that in any sample of believers, there are quasi-
believers who have not fully considered the implications of their beliefs, and 
informed believers who have (which is not to ignore the fact that there are 
non-believers who can be classed as informed skeptics but, as mentioned, 
the present study is focused on belief, not non-belief or disbelief). If ‘quasi-
believer’ and ‘informed believer’ are two legitimate types, as well as other 
possible types on a continuum of paranormal belief, scoring differences on 
primary items and related secondary items should help us to identify these 
types. Critically, these types may even display different psychological and 
behavioral traits than those that generally characterize the typical paranormal 
believer. In this paper, we will attempt to demonstrate such differences in 
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three areas: (i) the primary-item/secondary-item scoring dichotomy, (ii) 
reality testing, and (iii) depression.
Reality Testing
Reality testing comprises “a set of perceptual, cognitive, and sensorimotor 
acts that enables one to determine one’s relationship with the external 
physical and social environments” (Reber 1995:640). Irwin points out that 
hypotheses may be scrutinized “in the light of prior personal experience, 
general knowledge, and the input of authoritative others and similar 
sociocultural sources” (Irwin 2003:15), and he explains that the evaluative 
process of logical testing and probing translates as reality testing. For 
the purposes of this paper, we classify reality testing defi cits as cognitive 
defi cits.
While the concept of reality testing has been arguably associated with 
paranormal belief for some decades (Alcock 1981, Zusne & Jones 1982), 
empirical testing of the relationship is “meagre” or ‘artifactual’ (Irwin, 
2004:144). Irwin (2003) used three subscales from the Bell Object Relations 
and Reality Testing Inventory (BORRTI) (Bell 1995) to test against various 
subscales of PB as measured on Tobacyk’s Revised Paranormal Belief 
Scale (R-PBS), which include New Age Philosophy (NAP), Traditional 
Paranormal Beliefs (TPB), Extraordinary Life Forms, Precognition, 
Psi, Spiritualism, Superstition, and Witchcraft. The measures of reality 
testing from the BORRTI were ‘Reality Distortion’ (RD), ‘Uncertainty of 
Perception’ (UP), and ‘Hallucinations and Delusions’ (HD). Signifi cant 
effects (Spearman’s rs) ranged from weak to moderate (.15 to .58), in a 
sample drawn from a “general community of Australian adults” (Irwin 
2003:17)—only the correlations between Precognition and RD, and TRB 
and UP, were not signifi cant. After transformation of NAP, TPB, and UP 
data, regression analyses showed that (a) NAP was predicted by RD, UP, 
and HD, and (b) TPB was predicted by RD and HD.
Using the Reality Testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality 
Organisation (IPO-RT) (Lenzenweger et al. 2001), Irwin (2004) found 
reality testing defi cits (IPO-RT) correlated positively (Spearman’s rs) with 
the same measures of R-PBS, although TPB was replaced by Traditional 
Religious Beliefs (TRB). Effects ranged from weak to moderate (.32 to .63), 
in a sample drawn once again from a “general community of Australian 
adults” (Irwin 2004:147). Irwin concluded that some people, “when 
faced with an anomalous experience, jump to a paranormal interpretation 
without due critical testing of the logical plausibility of this belief” (Irwin 
2004:149). Irwin could not demonstrate ‘clinical’ levels of reality testing 
defi cits in his sample because the IPO-RT measures these defi cits in terms of 
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an “informational processing style” rather than as “psychotic phenomena” 
(Irwin 2004:145).
Dagnall et al. (2010) found signifi cant correlations (Pearson’s r) of 
moderate strength between reality testing defi cits (IPO-RT) and the two 
PB measures (NAP and TPB). They concluded that reality testing defi cits 
were “fundamentally involved in the formation and maintenance of some 
paranormal beliefs” (Dagnall et al. 2010:25). Drinkwater, Dagnall, and 
Parker (2012) replicated these two results, and a signifi cant correlation 
between Australian Sheep–Goat Scale (ASGS) (Thalbourne 1995) and IPO-
RT was also found.
Irwin and Marks (2013) have also found a signifi cant correlation of 
IPO-RT with their new subscale, New Age Belief (NAB), but not for their 
other subscale, Traditional Religious Belief (TRB), both of which make up 
their Survey of Scientifi cally Unaccepted Beliefs (a.k.a. Survey of Popular 
Beliefs). Recently, Irwin, Dagnall, and Drinkwater (2015) performed two 
bootstrapping regressions (since they had signifi cantly-skewed data) and 
found that the IPO-RT (their criterion variable) was again a predictor of 
NAB and, on this occasion, the TRB.
These fi ndings indicate a consistent effect, but they may prove only how 
conventional approaches fail to draw out other dimensions of paranormal 
belief.
Depression
Depression (including the depression dimension of bipolar disorder) may 
be related to paranormal belief (Irwin 2009, Thalbourne & Houran 2004). 
Depression is a low-mood state indicated by aversion to activity, with 
possible negative effects on a person’s thoughts, behavior, feelings, and 
well-being (DSM-IV-TR 2000). Given that depression is also described 
as a state of sadness, anxiety, emptiness, hopelessness, helplessness, 
worthlessness, guilt, irritability, shame, and restlessness, we class depression 
as a psychodynamic dysfunction. Depression per se and the depression 
dimension of bipolar disorder (i.e. manic-depression) are essentially the 
same. If a given paranormal belief measure correlates positively with a 
measure of manic-depression, it can be assumed that paranormal belief 
scores predict both mania and depression and not likely one or the other. 
For example, Thalbourne and Delin (1994) found that both Depressive 
Experience (measured on the Depression subscale of the Manic-Depression 
Scale, MDS) and Manic Experience (measured on the Mania subscale of 
the MDS) were both “signifi cantly and positively related to belief in, and 
alleged experience of, the paranormal” (cited in Thalbourne & Houran 
2004:140).
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Focusing on depression only, a combination of fi ndings exist with regard 
to the relationship between PB and trait depression (an ongoing, stable 
element of an individual, rather than a temporary state—see Spielberger 
et al. 2003). While some studies have found a positive relationship 
(Thalbourne & Delin 1994, Thalbourne & French 1995), others have found 
no association between the two (Zebb & Moore 2003). Tobacyk found a 
correlation between scores on the R-PBS and “depressive attributional 
style” (p. 864), the latter measured on the Attributional Style Questionnaire 
(Peterson et al. 1982). Though mixed fi ndings exist, they do generally 
suggest that trait depression may enhance susceptibility to PB.
The relationship between state depression and PB is also implied where 
‘helplessness’ (a cognitive aspect of depression, see Abramson, Seligman, 
& Teasdale 1978) correlated with scores on the R-PBS (Dudley 1999). 
However, Irwin (2009) suggests that depression is not necessarily indicated 
if a given situation was merely perceived to be uncontrollable.
From his own (sometimes co-authored) studies from 1994 to 2004, 
Thalbourne (2005) reports 10 out of 19 positive and signifi cant Depression/
PB correlations, but his review is confi ned to the same few researchers, and 
the effects are generally small. Overall, fi ndings by other researchers are 
mixed (see Irwin 2009:94 for details). More recently, in a study by Billows 
and Storm (2015a), depression measured on the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI-II) did not correlate signifi cantly with either the ASGS (Thalbourne 
1995) or the Basic Limiting Principles Questionnaire (Thalbourne 2010).
Rationale for the Study
It is clear that further research is needed in the above areas of defi cits and 
dysfunction, but we stress that it is crucial that any such research also 
involves critical approaches to PB that question current defi nitions and 
understandings. Measures of PB may be shown to be psychometrically 
sound, but we must also ask if those measures detect an internally consistent 
subset of propositions regarding an anomalous topic, its putative causes, 
and/or alternative examples of the topic. And, if not, we might ask how the 
presence of these apparent quasi-beliefs impacts on current conceptions of 
paranormal belief.
The over-arching aim of the present study is to develop and administer a 
question-set of PB items drawn from established PB measures to determine 
whether participants who self-report strong belief in primary items maintain 
this level of belief when responding to secondary items. To do this, we 
aim to construct a paranormal belief instrument (the so-called Paranormal 
Belief Informedness Scale) by which we shall endeavour to identify subsets 
of believers who may or may not exhibit varying levels of reality-testing 
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defi cits and depression. It is therefore crucial that we fi rst demonstrate the 
existence of, and differences between, primary and secondary items, and 
subsequently show that response differences between the two types of items 
help identify various believer types whose responses to particular measures 
of defi cits and dysfunction are not necessarily consistent.
Methods
Participants
The original study was divided into two parts. For Part 1, the initial sample 
(N = 387) comprised: (i) fi rst-year psychology students from the School 
of Psychology, University of Adelaide (Adelaide, South Australia), who 
received credit for laboratory participation (n = 71); (ii) students and 
staff from various disciplines from the University of Adelaide, including 
non-credited School of Psychology students (n = 36); and (iii) online 
respondents who were informed of the study by word of mouth or via 
various websites, including the Australian Institute of Parapsychological 
Research, Inc. (AIPR), a number of Facebook pages, and APD Performance 
Pty Ltd, a market research service (n = 280). All of the student-participants 
in (i) above, and most of the participants in (ii) above, completed the 
questionnaires in Lance Storm’s (L.S.) laboratory. No remuneration was 
offered for participation. The research was approved by the School of 
Psychology Ethics Sub-Committee.
Of 387 participants, 59% were females (n = 227), and 41% were male 
(n = 160). Age ranged from 18 to 81 years (M = 42 years, SD = 18 years, n 
= 386—one participant did not give age). Age distributed normally.
For Part 2, which was a qualitative study, we sought to screen and 
interview ten gamblers from various gambling establishments in the 
Manchester area, UK. Five gambling categories would be covered: horses, 
bingo, slots, cards, sports-betting. For comparative purposes, interviewees 
were either ‘high-scoring’ and ‘low-scoring’ on the so-called Paranormal 
Belief Informed Scale (PBIS; details about the PBIS are given in the Results 
section; a full report of Part 2 of this two-part study is planned as a separate 
article).
Measures
The study was administered via computer monitor and started with an 
information page (providing a plain language description of the aim and 
nature of the study and contact details for the principal experimenter and for 
counseling services in case of adverse reactions to the study). The information 
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page was followed by a consent form and a demographics inventory on 
one page each, followed by a test instrument labeled “Paranormal Belief 
Questionnaire” (PBQ). The latter included 244 anomalous and paranormal 
belief items drawn from ten established belief questionnaires. Six of these ten 
scales are regarded as “historically signifi cant” (Irwin 2009:177). Primarily, 
the three major parapsychological categories, extra-sensory perception 
(ESP, including telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition), psychokinesis 
(PK), and life after death (LAD), were covered, as were other paranormal 
and anomalous categories such as supernatural and religious beings, 
witchcraft and occult practices, superstition, spiritualism, and extraordinary 
life forms (i.e. ‘crypto-morphs’). The PBQ comprises all these categories as 
captured in the ten scales, which are here described:
1. Anomalous Experiences Inventory (AEI) (Gallagher, Kumar, & 
Pekala 1994). The full-scale AEI contains 70 true/false items that form fi ve 
subscales concerning anomalous/paranormal experiences, beliefs, abilities, 
fear of the paranormal/anomalous, and use of drugs and alcohol. Example 
item #9: “I have lived before.” The subscales have shown good convergent 
validity when correlated with selected personality measures. Specifi cally 
for the present study, the AEI acronym refers only to the Anomalous/
Paranormal Belief Subscale, consisting of 12 true/false items. The sub-
scale theoretical mean score is 6 (min. = 0; max. = 12).
2. Australian Sheep–Goat Scale (ASGS) (Thalbourne 1995, 2010). 
The ASGS is an 18-item self-report measure of belief in and alleged 
experience of the paranormal (ESP, psychokinesis, and life after death). 
Items are each scored 0 (false), 1 (uncertain), and 2 (true), along a visual 
analogue scale (e.g., “I am completely convinced that: ESP does not exist 
. . . . . . . . ESP exists”). Theoretical (raw) mean score = 18 (min. = 0; 
max. = 36). The ASGS data are ‘top-down purifi ed’ using Rasch-scaling 
techniques (Rasch 1980),4 thus yielding a measure that has interval-level 
properties (Lange & Thalbourne 2002). This procedure alters the scoring 
range and mean. Higher total scores indicate stronger beliefs in the facets 
of paranormal phenomena mentioned. For a total score on the Rasch-scaled 
ASGS (RASGS), only 16 of the 18 item-Rasch-scores are summed (the 
scores on the two afterlife items are not included). The RASGS has been 
standardized with a mean of 25 (SD = 5). RASGS scores range from 8.13 
to 43.39. In a good-sized sample (N = 131, Storm & Thalbourne 2005), the 
ASGS gave a high reliability coeffi cient, Cronbach’s α = 0.91 (Billows & 
Storm 2015a, report Cronbach’s α = 0.95).
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3. Basic Limiting Principles Questionnaire (BLPQ) (Thalbourne 
2010). The BLPQ is a 26-item self-report measure of belief in and alleged 
experience of the paranormal. It is an attempted improvement by Thalbourne 
(2010) on the ASGS, professing superior wording, alternate positive and 
negative wording to avoid acquiescence response bias, and additional items 
(four on mind–body dualism, three on paranormal healing, and two on 
clairvoyance; see Thalbourne 2010). Example item #2: “I believe I have had 
personal experience of ESP.” Each item includes a fi ve-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 5 = Strongly Agree. Theoretical (raw) 
mean score = 78 (min. = 26; max. = 130). Higher scores indicate stronger 
belief in the paranormal. Thus far, this measure has been used only once 
in a thesis by Billows (Billows 2014, see Billows & Storm 2015a, 2015b). 
Billows and Storm (2015a) report Cronbach’s α = 0.96. The BLPQ has 
since been Rasch-scaled (RBLPQ) (Lange 2016) to remove age and gender 
bias, resulting in a 23-item version. The RBLPQ has been standardized with 
a mean of 50 (SD = 15), scores range from 6.35 to 106.25.
4. Belief in the Paranormal Scale (BPS) (Jones, Russell, & Nickel 
1977). The BPS is a 25-item scale measuring psychic, supernatural, and 
occult phenomena, as well as “divination and prophecy, legendary creatures 
and civilizations, and other scientifi cally unattested phenomena” (Irwin 
2009:41). Example item #4: “I fi rmly believe that ghosts or spirits do exist.” 
Five items are negatively worded to discourage acquiescence. Responses are 
recorded on a fi ve-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree, 
to 5 = Strongly Agree. Scores range from 25 to 125. As far as the scale’s 
reliability (test–retest) and validity (predictive, concurrent, and construct) 
are concerned, Irwin reports that the scale has “psychometric adequacy” 
(Irwin 2007:42).
5. Extraordinary Beliefs Inventory (EBI) (Otis & Alcock 1982). 
The EBI is a 30-item scale measuring extraordinary beliefs such as “luck, 
spirits, religion, psychic phenomena, creatures, and fortune-telling” (Otis & 
Alcock 1982:81). Example item #19: “There is such a thing as extrasensory 
perception (ESP).” Responses are recorded on a seven-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree. Scores range 
from 30 to 210. Jones and Alcock reported that the consistency of responses 
was high, with alpha values ranging from .68 (creatures) to .92 (religion).
6. Jinks’ Belief Questionnaire (JBQ) (Jinks 2012a). The JBQ is an 
89-item paranormal and anomalous belief scale containing 14 primary 
items and 30 secondary items about ESP, PK, LAD, the Bermuda triangle, 
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extraterrestrials, mysterious hominids, lake monsters, ghosts, astrology, 
and the prophesies of Nostradamus, as well as: (a) a limited range of 
complementary and alternative medical categories (CAM), including feng 
shui, homeopathy, iridology, and acupuncture for the purpose of hypothesis 
testing; (b) four control items to determine the extent of participant 
cooperation, and (c) 41 cover items (decoys) to disguise the explicit 
association between primary items and similar but non-specifi c secondary 
items. The four control items included three patently false propositions: 
(i) “UFOs have landed in broad daylight near the Sydney Opera House”; 
(ii) “Some newborn babies can speak as well as adults”; (iii) “Some gifted 
people don’t need to eat or drink but can live on sunlight alone”; and one 
statement assuming agreement (“Some people have bad nightmares”). The 
order of presentation was randomized, with no question from the same 
category adjacent to another. Participants were required to answer items 
using a six-point Likert scale (Leung 2011) for the likelihood of the item’s 
content being true, with responses ranging from 1 = Defi nitely Not, to 5 = 
Defi nitely. Each topic consisted of between two and six items, with one 
primary item and the remainder being secondary items. The secondary 
items, referring to potential anomalous explanations for the concepts, 
events, entities, or personalities referred to in the primary item, were derived 
from the relevant literature sources (e.g., Berlitz 1974 for a sympathetic, 
paranormal explanation of disappearances in the “Bermuda Triangle,” or 
Barnes 2012 for an account of the shared ancestry of humans with mystery 
hominids).
7. Magical Ideation Scale (MIS) (Eckblad & Chapman 1983). The 
MIS, which consists of 30 true/false items, is a measure of paranormal 
aspects of magical ideation (i.e. “belief in forms of causation that by 
conventional standards are invalid”—Eckblad & Chapman 1983:215). The 
MIS has been used to predict symptoms of schizotypy and schizophrenia 
proneness. Example item #30. “I have sometimes felt that strangers were 
reading my mind.” Twenty-three items score 1 point for a ‘True’ response; 
seven items score 1 point for a ‘False’ response. Internal consistency 
reliability values are good: .82 (males); .85 (females).
8. Survey of Scientifi cally Unaccepted Beliefs (SSUB) (Irwin & 
Marks 2013)—also labeled the Survey of Popular Beliefs (SPB) for general 
use. The SSUB is a 20-item self-report survey that measures the “intensity 
of scientifi cally unaccepted beliefs” (Irwin & Marks 2013:150). There are 
two sub-scales in the SSUB: New Age Beliefs (NAB), 15 items, example 
item #9: “Fortune tellers can accurately sense the future using a crystal 
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ball”; and Traditional Religious Beliefs (TRB), 5 items, example item #1: 
“The Devil (Satan) is a real entity.” Responses range on a fi ve-point Likert 
scale from 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 5 = Strongly Agree. Irwin and Marks 
explain that scores on each scale are “computed as the sum of responses to 
the items in the respective scale and then converted to scores with interval-
level measurement” (Irwin & Marks 2013:150) based on Rasch-scaling 
techniques. The Rasch measures for both scales have been standardized 
with a mean of 25 (SD = 5). NAB scores range from 13.37 to 36.53; TRB 
scores range from 15.62 to 34.12. Cronbach’s α range across studies from 
.89 to .93 (Irwin 2015, Irwin, Dagnall, & Drinkwater 2015).
9. Paranormal Short Inventory (PSI) (Randall 1997). The PSI is 
a 13-item measure of paranormal belief. Example item #4: “Contrary to 
scientifi c opinion, there is some validity to fortune telling.” Seven items are 
reverse-scored (example item #2: “For the most part, people who claim to 
be psychics are in reality very good actors”). Responses are measured on 
a six-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Agree 
Strongly. The full-scale theoretical mean score is 45.5 (min. = 13; max. = 
78).
10. Paranormal Belief Scale-Revised (RPBS) (Tobacyk 2004). 
The RPBS (for convenience, PBS-R) is a 26-item scale that measures 
degree of belief in each of seven dimensions: Extraordinary Life Forms, 
Precognition, Psi, Spiritualism, Superstition, Traditional Religious Belief, 
and Witchcraft. Example item #21: “Some psychics can accurately predict 
the future.” Tobacyk (2004) notes improvements from the original 25-item 
PBS (see Tobacyk & Milford 1983), including the adoption of a seven-
point Likert scale, and item changes for three subscales (Extraordinary Life 
Forms, Precognition, and Witchcraft). The PBS-R boasts “greater reliability 
and validity, less restriction of range, and greater cross-cultural validity” 
(Tobacyk 2004:94). The full-scale theoretical mean score is 104 (min. = 
26; max. = 182). Four-week test–retest reliabilities for the PBS-R subscales 
range from .60 to .95.
Also administered were5:
(a) the Reality Testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality 
Organization (IPO-RT) (Lenzenweger et al. 2001)—a 20-item uni-
dimensional, self-report measure, which assesses aspects of reality testing. 
Responses are recorded on a fi ve-point Likert scale (1 = Never True, to 5 
= Always True). Total scores can range from 20 to 100, with high scores 
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indicating reality testing defi cits—example item #3: “When I’m nervous or 
confused, it seems like things in the outside world don’t make sense either.” 
Internal consistencies ranging from .85 to .87, and test–retest reliability 
correlated highly at r = .80 (Lenzenweger et al. 2001:579).
(b) Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II) (Beck, Steer, & Brown 
1996)—a 21-item self-report measure of depression, designed to align with 
characteristics of depression as dictated by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR). The items focus on symptoms 
of depression such as hopelessness, irritability, and changes in sleep and 
appetite. The BDI-II contains 21 questions, each answer being scored on a 
scale value of 0 to 3. Higher total scores indicate more severe depressive 
symptoms. Standardized cutoffs: 0 to 13 = “minimal depression’; 14 to 19 
= “mild depression”; 20 to 28 = “moderate depression”; and 29 to 63 = 
“severe depression” (Beck, Steer, & Garbin 1988). The BDI displays high 
internal consistency (α = 0.91), and one-week test–retest reliability, r = .93 
(Beck, Steer, & Brown 1996). Recent analysis of the instrument showed 
similar results with internal consistency of around α = .91 and test–retest 
ranging from r = .73 to .96 (Wang & Gorenstein 2013).
(c) Conformity Scale (CS) (Mehrabian & Stefl  1995)—an 11-item 
scale with each item scored on a nine-point scale (four items are reverse-
scored), ranging from −4 (‘very strong disagreement’) to +4 (‘very strong 
agreement’). Mehrabian (2005) defi nes conformity as “a characteristic 
willingness to identify with others and emulate them, to give in to others so 
as to avoid negative interactions, and generally to be a follower rather than a 
leader in terms of ideas, values, and behaviors“ (p. 2)—example item #1: “I 
often rely on, and act upon, the advice of others.” The CS was administered 
as a safeguard since some participants may be either conformist (or 
nonconformist) in their responses, and therefore indiscriminately agree (or 
disagree) to any or all items.
Procedure
Information and questionnaire material was presented on a computer 
monitor. Each stage of the experiment was time-stamped (i.e. after 
completion of each scale). All participants read the Information page and 
then confi rmed their acknowledgment on the Consent page—clicking onto 
the next screen automatically registered consent of the participant, who then 
provided some demographic details. Participants then completed the PBQ, 
IPO-RT, the BDI-II, and the CS. For the PBQ, participants were required 
to respond to items using the original Likert, visual analogue, multiple-
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choice, and dichotomous (i.e. True/False) options unique to each of the ten 
PB instruments. The design was not counterbalanced. In studies where there 
are manipulations of the independent variables, and the researcher wishes 
to eliminate order effects and demand characteristics, counterbalancing 
can be helpful (for examples, see Reis & Judd 2000). However, since the 
PBQ consists of ten paranormal belief scales, all of which measure the 
same construct, and since there were no treatments, order effects are likely 
to be small. The IPO-RT and the BDI-II are administered after the PBQ. 
The studies reviewed above also show that paranormal belief scales were 
administered before the reality testing scale (Irwin 2003, 2004), or the 
depression scales (Thalbourne & Delin 1994, Thalbourne & Houran 2004).
Prior to analysis of the PBQ data, we independently determined the 
primary and secondary items within standard scales using our criteria above 
(see fi rst paragraph in the section Primary and Secondary Paranormal 
Belief Items; see also the section Preliminary Item Assessment below). 
Jinks’ control items were used to screen out unsuitable participants. These 
items are not specifi cally associated with any of the paranormal categories. 
We then:
(i) ran an exploratory factor analysis, the highest factor loadings of 
which were used to construct a Paranormal Belief Informedness 
Scale (PBIS) comprising 10 primary items, and 10 secondary items;
(ii) identifi ed subsets of believers in the sample: (a) ‘primary believers’ 
who responded at any level of agreement to all 10 primary belief 
items of the PBIS (note that ‘agree’ was qualifi ed as ‘slightly,’ 
‘somewhat,’ ‘moderately,’ or ‘strongly’ depending on the Likert 
scale); (b) ‘primary non-believers’ who responded at any level 
of disagreement to all 10 primary belief items of the PBIS; (c) 
‘mixed believers’; a heterogeneous group who responded at 
any level of agreement with some of the 10 primary items in 
the PBIS; and (d) two smaller groups (i.e. quasi-believers and 
informed believers) derived from the primary believer group;6
(iii) compared response rates on primary and secondary items; and
(iv) differentiated mean-scoring and correlational differences between 
various belief types on reality testing defi cits and depression.
For details regarding (i), see the section Factor Analysis and Creation of 
the PBIS. Regarding (ii), (iii), and (iv), see the section Planned Analyses.
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Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Mean scores for primary belief items (by belief 
categories ESP, PK, and LAD, and paranormal belief generally) are higher 
than mean scores for secondary belief items for the three believer groups 
(primary non-believers, mixed-believers, and primary believers).
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Mean scores for secondary belief items (by belief 
categories ESP, PK, and LAD, and paranormal belief generally) are higher 
for informed believers than quasi-believers.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). There are rank-order relationships between para-
normal belief and reality testing defi cits and depression, both between and 
within believer groups.
Results
Preliminary Item Assessment
Prior to participant testing, there were two independent assessments of 
items from nine of the ten PB scales (the JBQ was not included in this 
assessment as that scale had been created with those subdivisions already 
established—see Jinks 2012a). Item assessment was by the fi rst and third 
authors (L.S. and A.L.J.), requiring subdivision of all items into two types 
(namely, primary and secondary). For the most part, there was mutual 
agreement on item assessment, although the wording of some items was 
ambiguous (these items were never used in the Factor Analysis). Table 1 
shows counts of primary and secondary items for all nine scales. Eckblad 
and Chapman’s (1983) MIS was a particular challenge for L.S. and A.L.J., 
who concluded that 18 of the 30 items (60%), although arguably secondary, 
were ambiguous. The diffi culty with the MIS may have stemmed from the 
fact that magical ideation tends to refer to specifi c ideas or situations and 
not to generalized notions.
Data from a total of 387 respondents (cases) were collected. All data 
were checked for scores of 5 (very probably) or 6 (defi nitely) to at least one 
of the three patently false control items, and scores of 1 (defi nitely not) to 
the “nightmare” item. These participants may have been non-cooperative or 
acquiescent (Krosnick 1999). In total, 35 cases were removed due to extreme 
scores on these items as just indicated. Another nine cases were removed 
for completing the entire online task in less than 10 minutes (prior testing 
of the time taken to read through the entire survey as fast as reasonably 
possible, not including time to ponder answers, and without actually using 
the mouse to select answers, took about 20 minutes; the median time taken 
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to complete the survey was 55 minutes, which is close to the advertised 
time of 50 minutes based on legitimate pre-testing). Ultimately, the data of 
44 respondents (11%) were excluded from the analysis on account of these 
two screenings.
Levels of conformity as measured on the Conformity Scale (CS) 
(Mehrabian & Stefl , 1995) were then assessed with the aim of excluding 
low- or high-scoring participants from further analysis. CS scores are 
shown in Table 2. To test the distributions for normality, the skewness and 
kurtosis values were divided by their respective SE values (if the statistics 
TABLE 1
Primary and Secondary Items for the Nine Paranormal Belief Scales
PB Scale Primary 
Items
Secondary 
Items
Ambiguous 
Items
Totals
1.   AEI   4   8 n/a 12
2.   ASGS 10   7   1 18
3.   BLPQ 16 10 n/a 26
4.   BPS 18   6   1 25
5.   EBI 24   6 n/a 30
6.   MIS   7   5 18 30
7.   PBS-R 17   9 n/a 26
8.   PSI   9   4 n/a 13
9a. SPB-NAB   9   6 n/a 15
9b. SPB-TRB   4   1 n/a   5
Total Items         118           62 20           200
AEI = Anomalous Experiences Inventory; ASGS = Australian Sheep–Goat Scale; BLPQ = Basic Limiting Principles 
Questionnaire; BPS = Belief in the Paranormal Scale; EBI = Extraordinary Beliefs Inventory; MIS = Magical 
Ideation Scale; PBS-R = Paranormal Belief Scale–Revised; PSI = Paranormal Short Inventory; SPB-NAB = Survey 
of Popular Beliefs (New Age Belief); SPB-TRB = Survey of Popular Beliefs (Traditional Religious Belief); n/a = 
not applicable 
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fall between ±1.96 they are not signifi cant, and are regarded as normal; 
see George & Mallery 2010). Test results showed that the data curve was 
signifi cantly left-skewed (p = .027), suggesting that some number of low-
scoring non-conformists accounted for the curve’s deviation from normality. 
Although the Shapiro-Wilk test result was signifi cant (p < .001), the lowest 
scores came from only two cases, each of whom had non-signifi cantly low 
scores of −22 (z = 1.28, p = .100), and, given that the theoretical lowest score 
is considerably lower at −44, we did not deem these two cases signifi cantly 
nonconformist. This assumption was supported by inspection of a box-and-
whiskers graph which showed no outliers.
Descriptive statistics of all paranormal belief scales using data from the 
fi nal reduced database (N = 343) are given in Table 2, including Cronbach’s 
α values for each scale. Even though all efforts were made to produce an 
acceptable database for analyses, all PB scales were signifi cantly skewed 
and/or kurtotic. The same was the case for the IPO-RT and BDI-II scales. 
It was decided that all hypotheses would be tested using nonparametric 
statistical tests where possible since the measures are ordinal or interval 
(e.g., Likert scales), and the relationships are monotonic (inspections of the 
distributions showed this to be so). In Hypothesis 1, we conducted Repeated 
Measures ANOVA, but we made appropriate tests on group variance 
beforehand.
A series of non-hypothesized Spearman’s rs correlations on PB scale 
scores (ten scales) for comparative purposes are given in Table 3. It can be 
seen that all scales (and subscales) correlate signifi cantly, which is generally 
to be expected. The strengths of the correlations (moderate to high) are fairly 
consistent across scales. Weaker rank correlation coeffi cients are found 
to be consistent across belief scales for the three subscales, Superstition 
(from the PBS-R), Traditional Religious Belief (PBS-TRB), and Traditional 
Religious Belief (SPB-TRB), although the two TRB subscales correlate 
very highly, as is to be expected, rs(341) = .91.
We then produced a correlation matrix of the 114 items to assess the 
strength of relationships since a matrix that is factorable should include 
sizeable correlations (we required all correlations to be over .30). Overall, 
the matrix was a positive manifold, but seven items were removed for 
having values <.30. This fi nal count of 107 items was submitted for factor 
analysis (FA).
Factor Analysis and Creation of the PBIS
The fi nal database was ready for the next stage of assessment. Given N = 
343, our sample size was considered acceptable for FA. Cattell (1978:508, 
see also Arrindell & van der Ende 1985:166) recommends an absolute 
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics (N = 343): Twelve Paranormal Belief Scales, 
Conformity, Depression, and Reality Testing Deficits
Variable M SD Min. Max. Cronbach’s α
1.     AEI     6.56     3.60      0.00   12.00 .87
2.     ASGS (R)   23.50     8.32      8.13   43.39 .95
3.     BLPQ (R)   52.17   11.94      6.35   88.70 .96
4.     BPS   70.70   22.59    25.00 116.00 .96
5.     EBI 107.38   40.95    30.00 191.00 .97
6.     JBQ 117.86   41.30    44.00 245.00 .98
7.     MIS     7.85     5.78      0.00   24.00 .87
8.     PBIS   27.92     7.36    20.00   40.00 .96
9.     PBS-R (Full Scale)   92.90   32.94    29.00 157.00 .95
        PBS-R Subscales
               Extraor. Life Forms     3.64     1.23      1.00     7.00 .60
               Precognition     3.51     1.68       1.00     7.00 .90
               Psi     3.72     1.63      1.00     7.00 .87
               Spiritualism     3.96     1.89      1.00     7.00 .92
               Superstition     2.09     1.37      1.00     7.00 .91
               Trad. Religious Belief     4.01     1.82      1.00     7.00 .85
               Witchcraft     3.74     1.80      1.00     7.00 .91
10.   PSI   40.45   13.68    14.00   72.00 .89
11.   SPB-NAB   24.12     3.37    13.37   31.94 .93
12.   SPB-TRB   24.28     4.42    15.62   34.12 .87
13.   Conformity     7.21   11.53 −22.00   36.00 .71
14.   Depression (BDI II)   11.36   11.30      0.00   59.00 .95
15.   Reality Testing (IPO-RT)   45.22   15.12    20.00   90.00 .92
AEI = Anomalous Experiences Inventory; ASGS (R) = Rasch-scaled Australian Sheep–Goat Scale; BLPQ (R) = 
Rasch-scaled Basic Limiting Principles Questionnaire; BPS = Belief in the Paranormal Scale; EBI = Extraordinary 
Beliefs Inventory; JBQ = Jinks’ Belief Questionnaire; MIS = Magical Ideation Scale; PBIS = Paranormal Belief 
Informedness Scale; PBS-R = Paranormal Belief Scale–Revised; PSI = Paranormal Short Inventory; SPB-NAB = 
Survey of Popular Beliefs (New Age Belief); SPB-TRB = Survey of Popular Beliefs (Traditional Religious Belief).
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minimum sample size of no less than 250, but others advise larger samples—
see Comrey & Lee 1992, who consider 300 to be ‘good’). Also, we could 
have opted for a subject-to-variable (STV) ratio as low as 2:1, as suggested 
by Kline (1979:40), provided there is a minimum of 100 participants, and 
the lower limit of variables-to-factors ratio is 3 to 6, which was not an issue 
since we ran our FA for a single PB factor. However, we followed the rule 
that the STV ratio should be at least 3:1 (for pilot and theoretical studies), 
giving us an upper limit of 114 items that we could confi dently enter into 
the FA.
Prior to this consideration (as we could not foresee how many 
participants we would get, or would be left with after screening), we had 
already decided in advance to create a Paranormal Belief Informedness Scale 
(PBIS) comprising only items that speak to conventional PB phenomena 
(namely, ESP, PK, and LAD items). Although there were nine PB scales 
with a total of 200 items (JBQ data was not entered into the FA, as we 
plan to analyze that data in a followup study), we reduced this number to 
107 items that describe only these three conventional PB phenomena (65 
primary belief items, and 42 secondary belief items).
Factor Analysis (principal axis factoring) was conducted, given that 
we are interested only in common variance, or, put another way, we only 
wished to analyze covariation among items, without intrusion of the specifi c 
variance associated with particular items. Only one factor was extracted, as 
we were preparing a single PB scale and not interested in factors per se 
as the items are all from previously published and validated scales with 
no purpose served in factor-wise reassessment of the items. Furthermore, 
for the purposes of hypothesis testing, we are only interested in primary/
secondary differences. As a failsafe measure, we conducted another Factor 
Analysis, and a Principal Components Analysis, both allowing for multiple 
factors as discerned from Eigenvalues over 1.00. As it happened, in both 
cases, only one factor proved viable, with other factors producing loadings 
that were considerably smaller.
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was 0.98, 
which Kaiser (1974) characterizes as “marvelous.” Moreover, Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity gave a value that was large and signifi cant: 42253.40, df 
= 5671, p < .001, so it appears unlikely that the correlation matrix is an 
identity matrix. Once again, the data were appropriate for factor analysis. 
The Factor Matrix is described next.
Our single factor has an Extraction Sum of 57.62, with 53.85% of the 
variance explained. As there are too many items to list, factor loadings 
ranged from .412 to .904, and communalities ranged from .170 to .802. 
Factor loadings (starting from the highest and working downward) were 
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used to select the items for a 20-item PBIS scale comprising 10 primary 
belief items and 10 secondary belief items. These 20 items are listed in the 
Appendix. It can be seen that they come from fi ve scales: BLPQ (2 items), 
EBI (8 items), PBS-R (3 items), BPS (4 items), and PSI (3 items).
The next step in PBIS scale development was to standardize the scoring 
of the 20 items for hypothesis testing in the next section. In fact, due to 
further testing requirements, this standardization was necessary for all items 
since the PB measures use scoring methods ranging from true/false scales, 
to fi ve-, six-, and seven-point Likert scales. Since responses for all scales 
are essentially binary (i.e. agreement vs. disagreement), we recoded all 
responses (disagreement = 1; agreement = 2), thus yielding dichotomous 
items. The PBIS theoretical mean score would be 30.00, but actual mean 
score was 27.92 (SD = 7.36; see Table 2 for other statistics). The distribution 
was signifi cantly skewed and kurtotic, but there were no outliers.
Planned Analyses
H1: Mean scores for primary belief items (by belief categories 
ESP, PK, and LAD, and paranormal belief generally) are higher than 
mean scores for secondary belief items for the three believer groups 
(primary non-believers, mixed-believers, and primary believers). 
Testing this hypothesis involved assessing whether there was a scoring 
differential between mean scores on primary items and secondary items for 
each paranormal category: ESP, PK, and LAD, and for paranormal belief 
generally. Testing would also necessarily involve discerning differences 
between types of believer (i.e. we expect scoring to increase across the 
groups primary non-believers, mixed believers, and primary believers, in 
that order). We applied only one strict criterion for selection as a primary 
believer; respondents had to agree with all 10 primary items in the PBIS.7 
This criterion is necessary because if disagreement with even one primary 
item is allowed, other belief types could not be labeled as distinct types due 
to category overlap and statistical test results would be ambiguous. Primary 
non-believers were respondents who disagreed with all 10 primary items in 
the PBIS. The remainder were a heterogeneous (mixed) group of believers 
(they agreed or disagreed with any number of the 10 primary items in the 
PBIS). Scores on secondary items were included to make up the full PBIS 
score. There were 115 primary non-believers, 180 mixed believers, and 48 
primary believers. Table 4 lists the PBIS mean scores for the three believer 
types.
A series of four Repeated Measures ANOVA tests were conducted to 
determine scoring differences: items (primary vs. secondary)  group (three 
primary believer types), where ‘items’ is our within-subjects variable, and 
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‘group’ is our between-subjects factor. It is emphasized that the primary and 
secondary item scores are separate variables and therefore the relatedness of 
their means cannot be tested other than by Repeated Measures ANOVA and, 
albeit routine, it is mandatory (and certainly not a perfunctory exercise) to 
test group differences, again justifying Repeated Measures ANOVA.
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics: Paranormal Belief Informedness Scale (PBIS), 
Reality Testing Deficits (IPO-RT), and Depression (BDI-II) for Believer Types
 M SD
PBIS
1.  Primary Non-Believers (n = 115) 20.40    0.83
2.  Mixed Believers (n = 180) 29.65    5.31
3.  Primary Believers (n = 48) 39.35    1.18
 Quasi-Believers (n = 17) 38.18    1.33
 Informed Believers (n = 31) 40.00    0.00
IPO-RT
1.  Primary Non-Believers (n = 115) 37.03 12.58
2.  Mixed Believers (n = 180) 47.69 14.47
3.  Primary Believers (n = 48) 55.56 13.61
 Quasi-Believers (n = 17) 54.59 14.48
 Informed Believers (n = 31) 56.10 13.32
BDI-II
1.  Primary Non-Believers (n = 115) 11.77 13.00
2.  Mixed Believers (n = 180) 11.22 10.56
3.  Primary Believers (n = 48) 10.92    9.69
 Quasi-Believers (n = 17) 11.94    9.38
 Informed Believers (n = 31) 10.35    9.96
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For the ANOVA to be valid, and ensure full variance in the item 
measures across types, we used the 87 remaining (or so-called ‘excluded’) 
non-PBIS items from the established scales after their original scores had 
been standardized via conversion to binary scores (i.e. agree/disagree). 
These 87 were also divided into primary and secondary for the comparisons 
to be run in the ANOVA tests. We were aware that some scales contained 
ambiguous items that might contaminate the results due to category overlap, 
so we excluded these items from the analyses. There were six primary items 
that could be about ESP or PK, and one that could be about ESP, or PK, or 
LAD, and one that could be about PK or LAD; there were three secondary 
items that could be about ESP, or PK, or LAD; and one secondary item 
that could describe either ESP or LAD. A total of 12 items were removed 
leaving 75 items: 47 primary items (ESP: 24 items; PK: 8 items; and LAD: 
15 items); and 28 secondary items (ESP: 17 items; PK: 3 items; and LAD: 
8 items). We are skeptical about the test validity on PK items with so few 
primary and secondary items (especially as there are only three secondary 
PK items—we comment further on this problem in the Discussion).
Levene’s tests showed that the three belief groups failed to meet the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance, but pre-testing on the data using 
Welch’s F test and Brown-Forsythe test indicated that the groups are 
nevertheless signifi cantly different in spite of the violation (Tomarken & 
Serlin 1986).
Repeated measures ANOVA on ESP items. Table 5 lists mean 
scores on the 75-item scale by believer type and psi category. Results were 
signifi cant, and in the directions expected: Items, F(1, 340) = 5.90, p = 
.02, partial eta-squared (η2) = .017; Believer type, F(2, 340) = 293.91, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .63 (primary/secondary item scoring was signifi cantly 
different, and all groups were signifi cantly different from each other). There 
was also a signifi cant interaction effect, Item  Type, F(2, 340) = 3.20, p = 
.042, partial η2 = .02. The interaction effect means the primary/secondary 
item scoring gap was not constant across levels of belief, but widened 
disproportionately. In other words, the scoring gap was determined in part 
by group membership and not by the primary–secondary difference alone. 
Figure 1 illustrates these effects.
Repeated measures ANOVA on PK items. Results were signifi cant, 
but only two effects (group and interaction) were in the directions expected—
the primary/secondary item difference was not in the direction hypothesized: 
Items, F(1, 340) = 103.05, p < .001, partial η2 = .23; Believer type, F(2, 340) 
= 199.88, p < .001, partial η2 = .54 (all groups were signifi cantly different 
from each other). There was also a signifi cant interaction effect, Item 
Type, F(2, 340) = 4.68, p = .010, partial η2 = .03. Figure 2 illustrates these 
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TABLE 5
Descriptive Statistics: Mean Item Score for Psi Categories 
(ESP, PK, and LAD) by Believer Type (75 Items)
  Item Type Believer * Mean SD
Primary ESP Items 1 1.08 0.08
2 1.41 0.23
3 1.82 0.13
Total 1.36 0.30
Secondary ESP Items 1 1.09 0.10
2 1.39 0.25
3 1.79 0.15
Total 1.31 0.30
Primary PK Items 1 1.03 0.08
2 1.21 0.22
3 1.59 0.25
Total 1.20 0.26
Secondary PK Items 1 1.12 0.21
2 1.41 0.32
3 1.85 0.21
Total 1.38 0.36
Primary LAD Items 1 1.15 0.19
2 1.54 0.31
3 1.90 0.12
Total 1.46 0.36
Secondary LAD Items 1 1.11 0.12
2 1.42 0.26
3 1.81 0.19
Total 1.37 0.31
All Primary Psi Items 1 3.25 0.24
2 4.16 0.61
3 5.31 0.40
Total 4.02 0.82
All Secondary Psi Items 1 3.32 0.29
2 4.21 0.66
3 5.44 0.41
Total 4.08 0.86
* 1 = primary non-believers (n = 115); 2 = mixed-believers (n = 180); 3 = primary believers (n = 48)
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Figure 1.  Belief in ESP: Three signifi cant eff ects: (i) item (primary vs. secondary); 
(ii) group (1 = primary non-believers; 2 = mixed believers; 3 = prim-
ary believers); and (iii) interaction. All eff ects are in the directions 
hypothesized.
Figure 2.  Belief in PK: Three signifi cant eff ects: (i) item (primary vs. secondary); 
(ii) believer group (1 = primary non-believers; 2 = mixed believers; 3 = 
primary believers), and (iii) interaction.
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effects. We will discuss the unexpected ‘Items’ result in the Discussion 
section.
Repeated measures ANOVA on LAD items. Results were signifi cant, 
and in the directions expected: Items, F(1, 340) = 27.08, p < .001, partial η2 
= .07; Believer type, F(2, 340) = 245.93, p < .001, partial η2 = .59 (all groups 
were signifi cantly different from each other). There was also a signifi cant 
interaction effect, Item Group, F(2, 340) = 3.30, p = .038, partial = .02. 
Figure 3 illustrates these effects.
Repeated measures ANOVA on paranormal belief (all psi items). 
Two results were signifi cant, but only one effect (group) was in the direction 
expected: Believer type, F(2, 340) = 336.68, p < .001, partial η2 = .66 (all 
groups were signifi cantly different from each other). The primary/secondary 
item difference was not in the direction hypothesized: Items, F(1, 340) = 
14.62, p < .001, partial η2 = .04. There was no signifi cant interaction effect, 
Item  Type, F(2, 340) = 0.98, p = .378, partial η2 = .01. Figure 4 illustrates 
these effects. Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. We will discuss the 
unexpected ‘Items’ result in the Discussion section.
H2: Mean scores for secondary belief items (by belief categories 
ESP, PK, and LAD, and paranormal belief generally) are higher for 
informed believers than quasi-believers. A major aim of the present study 
was to differentiate informed believers from quasi-believers on secondary 
item scoring as Jinks (2012a) had done. Informed believers respond 
affi rmatively to all primary and all secondary items in the PBIS, whereas 
quasi-believers respond affi rmatively to all primary items only in the PBIS, 
but they respond negatively to all secondary items in the PBIS. We found 
31 informed believers among the 48 primary believers. Thirty-one informed 
believers in a sample of 343 participants is about 9%. There were 17 quasi-
believers. Data from the 75-items scale were analyzed using Mann-Whitney 
U tests.
For ESP, secondary item scoring was signifi cantly higher for informed 
believers (Mdn = 1.82) than for quasi-believers (Mdn = 1.76), U = 157.50, 
p = .011 (one-tailed), r = .33.
For PK, secondary item scoring was signifi cantly higher for informed 
believers (Mdn = 2.00) than for quasi-believers (Mdn = 1.67), U = 194.00, 
p = .041 (one-tailed), r = .43.
For LAD, secondary item scoring was signifi cantly higher for informed 
believers (Mdn = 1.88) than for quasi-believers (Mdn = 1.75), U = 141.00, 
p = .004 (two-tailed), r = .39.
For psi generally, secondary item scoring was signifi cantly higher for 
informed believers (Mdn = 5.64) than for quasi-believers (Mdn = 5.27), U = 
125.50, p = .002 (one-tailed), r = .43. The four-part hypothesis was supported.
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Figure 3.  Belief in Life After Death: Three signifi cant eff ects: (i) item (primary vs. 
secondary); (ii) believer group (1 = primary non-believers; 2 = mixed 
believers; 3 = primary believers); and (iii) interaction. All eff ects are in 
the directions hypothesized.
Figure 4. Paranormal Belief: Two signifi cant eff ects: (i) item (primary vs. 
secondary); and (ii) group (1 = primary non-believers; 2 = mixed 
believers; 3 = primary believers).
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To illustrate the kind of thinking that underpins quasi-belief, we take 
three examples from the PBIS (one from each psi category ESP, PK, and 
LAD) to show the response inconsistencies of quasi-believers. In the ESP 
category, informed believers endorsed the primary item ebi10 (“Psychics 
possess a mysterious ability to know things about a person’s past and 
future”) and the secondary item ebi23 (“Some people have a mysterious 
ability to accurately predict such things as natural disasters, election results, 
political assassinations, etc.”), whereas quasi-believers endorsed only the 
primary item. The difference between the two types of believer may lie in 
the failure of quasi-believers to extend their belief about psychics’ knowing 
“things about a person’s . . . future” to ‘predictions’ about specifi c personal 
events (“election results, political assassinations”), and/or impersonal 
events (“natural disasters”).
In the PK category, informed believers endorsed the primary item 
ebi1 (“There is a real phenomenon known as psychokinesis (the ability to 
move objects by the power of the mind)”), and the secondary item pbs16 
(“A person’s thoughts can infl uence the movement of a physical object”), 
whereas quasi-believers endorsed only the primary item. The difference 
between the two types of believer may lie in the failure of quasi-believers 
to equate “the power of the mind” with “the infl uence” of a “person’s 
thoughts,” both of which (mind power and thoughts) are generally seen as 
the underlying mechanism of psychokinesis.
For LAD, informed believers endorsed the primary item bps8 (“Through 
psychic individuals it is possible to communicate with the dead”) and the 
secondary item ebi12 (“There is such a thing as astral projection (where 
the body remains behind while the spirit travels)”), whereas quasi-believers 
endorsed only the primary item. The difference between the two types of 
believer would seem to lie in the assumption that quasi-believers tend not 
equate “the dead” with the “spirit.” Inspection of the PBIS (Appendix A) 
shows that similar assumptions about quasi-believers can be drawn from 
other item dichotomies.
H3: There are rank-order relationships between paranormal belief 
and reality testing defi cits and depression, both between and within 
believer groups.
Reality testing defi cits. Table 4 above lists IPO-RT mean scores by 
believer types. It can be seen that reality testing (RT) defi cits generally 
increase across believer groups as PB increases. A Jonckheere-Terpstra 
test for ordered alternatives showed that there was a statistically 
signifi cant trend of higher median RT scores with higher levels of PB 
(from primary non-believer, mixed believer, to primary believer), TJT = 
24,822.50, z = 7.72, p < .001 (two-tailed). A signifi cant Kendall’s tau-b 
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shows a weak-to-moderate effect (RT tended to increase with PB group), 
r
τ
(341) = .33, p < .001 (two-tailed).
Even though this signifi cant trend lends support to the literature (see 
Introduction), these fi ndings do not tell the whole story about the relationships 
between PB and RT defi cits within groups. We ran Spearman’s rs tests for 
the groups, including one new group—a sub-group of the primary non-
believers which we call informed skeptics (n = 87) because they respond 
negatively to all primary and all secondary items in the PBIS. This sub-
group can be justifi ably classed as ‘informed’ following our defi nition of 
consistent responding to primary and secondary items.
We need to point out that we cannot validly use PBIS scores in these 
tests because primary believers effectively have the highest PBIS scores 
on all 10 primary items (i.e. only the ‘agreement’ levels are included since 
agreement defi nes that type). Similarly, primary non-believers effectively 
have the lowest PBIS scores because their scores on all 10 primary items 
are the lowest (i.e. ‘disagreement’ defi nes that type). Therefore, variance on 
the 10 primary items would be reduced for primary believers and primary 
non-believers, though not for the full sample or mixed-believers. It would 
therefore be the case that signifi cant correlations, with the PBIS as one 
variable, would probably be artifacts caused by the reduced variance in 
the PBIS. We therefore ran our tests on the same 75-item dataset (i.e. the 
excluded-items dataset) that was used in the series of tests on Hypotheses 
1 and 2, and not only did we form one generalized paranormal belief set, 
we also preserved believer category, item category, and psi category, to see 
if the RT correlates would vary across these categories. We thus ran nine 
category tests for the full sample, and nine category tests for each of the six 
groups derived thereof.
Table 6 lists the correlations. As can be seen, all nine of nine correlations 
are signifi cant for the full sample, across psi (ESP, PK, and LAD) and item 
(Primary, Secondary) categories, but the trend tends to dissolve across 
believer groups (i.e. as paranormal belief increases). Primary non-believers 
showed eight signifi cant correlations out of nine; informed skeptics showed 
seven signifi cant correlations out of nine; mixed-believers showed four 
signifi cant correlations out of nine (note that mixed believers is the biggest 
group; n = 180); and fi nally primary believers, and the subgroups thereof 
(quasi-believers and informed believers) have no signifi cant correlations 
between them (note, too, that generally the correlations are very weak for 
those subgroups).
Bonferroni correction was made by dividing the critical p value (α ≤ 
.05) by the number of correlations, which was 63: The new critical p = 
.05/63 = .0008. The nine full-sample correlations remain signifi cant, as do 
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two others: (i) ‘All Psi’ (primary items only) for primary non-believers, and 
(ii) LAD (secondary items only) for mixed believers.
We then tested the difference between the correlation coeffi cients using 
the rs values for the full sample as test statistics for comparisons against the 
corresponding rs values for each group. There were 32 signifi cant z-score 
differences out of 54 (59%). A Bonferroni correction was made by dividing 
the critical p value (α = .05) by the number of tests. The new critical p = 
.05/54 = .0009. The count was reduced to 6/54, or 11%, which is more than 
twice the 5% we might expect by chance.
The hypothesis of relationships between paranormal belief and reality 
testing defi cits was supported for the full sample across psi categories and 
item types, but not generally across believer types.
Depression. Table 2 above shows descriptive statistics for the BDI-II 
(Depression) scale (N = 343)—we note the mean BDI score is 11.36 (SD 
= 11.30), which is in the “minimal depression” (i.e. lowest) range of 
TABLE 6
Correlations: Reality Testing Deficits (IPO-RT) 
by Paranormal Belief, Item, and Psi Category
Variable
(75-items)
Full Sample
(N = 343)
Primary Non-
Believers
(n = 115)
Informed 
Skeptics
(n = 87)
Mixed-
Believers
(n = 180)
Primary 
Believers
(n = 48)
Quasi-
Believers
(n = 17)
Informed 
Believers
(n = 31)
Primary Items
ESP .40***   .29**    .33**  .01    .05    .01    .02
PK .41***   .29**    .30**   .20* −.09 −.07 −.14
LAD .34***  .18*   .22*  .03    .26    .35    .18
All Psi (P) .41***    .32***    .34**  .09    .02 −.02 −.08
Secondary Items
ESP .40***   .24**   .23*  .12    .20    .20    .14
PK .35***  .22*  .19  .12    .09 −.06    .14
LAD .43*** .14  .10     .26***    .10 −.10    .10
All Psi (S) .45***   .29**   .25*    .20**    .16    .01    .15
 All Psi + (P + S) .44***   .32**    .31**   .15*    .07 −.02    .01
All Psi = ESP + PK + LAD; P = Primary; S = Secondary; *** p < .001 (two-tailed); ** p < .01 (two-tailed); * p < .05 
(two-tailed)
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0 to 13 (Beck, Steer, & Garbin 1988). Table 4 above lists BDI mean scores 
by believer types. It can be seen that mean scores for depression generally 
decrease across the groups and is lowest for primary believers. However, a 
Jonckheere-Terpstra test for ordered alternatives showed that the trend of 
higher median BDI-II scores with lower levels of PB was not signifi cant, 
TJT = 17,891.00, z = 0.48, p = .629 (two-tailed). Kendall’s tau-b shows no 
effect (BDI-II is effectively constant across groups), r
τ
(341) = .02, p = .629 
(two-tailed).
We ran tests on the 75-item dataset, using believer category, item 
category, and psi category, as before. For the full sample, correlations 
ranged between −.001 and .03 (none were signifi cant); primary non-
believers, correlations ranged between −.02 and .16 (none were signifi cant); 
mixed believers, correlations ranged between −.01 and .06 (none were 
signifi cant); and primary believers, of which correlations were all negative, 
ranging between −.01 to −.44 (the latter being signifi cant, p = .002). This 
one signifi cant correlation out of 24 tests can be attributed to chance, and 
the general picture is that depression is constant whatever the level of PB.
Discriminant functions analysis. It must be borne in mind that the PBIS 
has primary and secondary subscales, scores of which are used to construct 
the three different groups, primary non-believers, mixed believers, and 
primary believers. Since this grouping factor cannot be taken into account 
in a regression analysis, we reversed our aims and conducted a discriminant 
functions analysis to fi nd a model that might predict membership in the three 
groups based on scores on reality testing defi cits (IPO-RT) and depression 
(BDI-II). If the literature is correct, this model should show that reality 
testing defi cits and depression predict membership in the paranormal belief 
groups, but we propose that these relationships are tenuous and do not apply 
across all believer groups.
The assumption of equal group variance was met, as Box’s M test 
was not signifi cant at the critical level α < .001, F(6, 179044.94) = 2.48, 
p = .021. As there were three groups, two functions were extracted. Only 
the fi rst discriminant function was signifi cant, Wilks’ λ = 0.80, χ(4, N = 
343) = 76.47, p < .001 (Canonical correlation = .45). Function 1 had an 
Eigenvalue of 0.25, accounting for 100% of the explained variance between 
groups. Function 2 had an Eigenvalue of zero, explaining 0% of variance. 
We conclude that the reality testing measure (IPO-RT) has some predictive 
capacity, but depression (BDI-II) does not.
From Table 7 it can be seen that membership of mixed believers was 
predicted with the greatest accuracy (80.0%), followed by primary non-
believers (53.9%). However, primary believers were predicted with least 
accuracy (2.1%). Although 60.3% of the original grouped cases have been 
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correctly classifi ed, the model fails for primary believers. In essence, reality 
testing did not predict for primary believers (see Discussion for more details).
Post Hoc Analyses
A reconsideration of reality testing. As a defense of the PBIS, we 
conducted Spearman’s rs tests on the reality testing variable with the nine 
PB scales and nine PB subscales (as well as the BDI-II, Conformity, and 
the SES). These correlations are presented in Table 8. Focusing on the 
established PB scales only, all 18 of 18 correlations are signifi cant for the 
full sample, primary believers, skeptics. It seems an insurmountable fact 
that there are weak-to-moderate relationships between paranormal belief (in 
some of its various forms) and reality testing defi cits. However, the trend 
starts to fragment as we move through the remaining types: Fourteen are 
signifi cant for mixed believers; fi ve are signifi cant for primary believers; 
only three for quasi-believers, and only two for informed believers.
If we correct for multiple analysis (Bonferroni adjusted to p = .05/126 
= .0004), our fi ndings do not change for counts at the level of p < .001 (full 
sample, and most correlations for primary non-believers, informed skeptics, 
and mixed believers). The only signifi cant correlation for primary believers 
(MIS; r = .64) maintains signifi cance after adjustment, and bootstrapping 
revealed that the 95% CI [.39, .80] does not include zero. As we may expect, no 
correlations maintained signifi cance for quasi-believers and informed believers.
We then tested the difference between the correlation coeffi cients using 
the rs values for the full sample as test statistics for comparisons against the 
TABLE 7
Group Classification Matrix Using Reality Testing Deficits (IPO-RT) and 
Depression (BDI-II) as Predictors of Believer Group Membership
Group
Predicted Group Membership
Primary 
Non-
Believers
Mixed 
Believers
Primary 
Believers Total Count (%)
Primary Non-
Believers 62 (53.9%)    53 (46.1%) 0 (3.0%) 115 (100%)
Mixed Believers 34 (18.9%)  144 (80.0%) 2 (1.1%) 180 (100%)
Primary Believers   4 (08.3%)     43 (89.6%) 1 (2.1%)   48 (100%)
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TABLE 8
Reality Testing (IPO-RT) Correlations (Spearman’s rs): Ten PB Scales, 
Depression (BDI-II), Conformity, and Spiritual Emergency
Reality Testing Deficits
Scale
Full 
Sample
(N = 343)
Primary
Non-
Believers
(n = 115)
Informed
Skeptics
(n = 87)
Mixed 
Believers
(n = 180)
Primary 
Believers
(n = 48)
Quasi-
Believers
(n = 17)
Informed
Believers
(n = 31)
1.   AEI  .44***    .27** .22*   .20**    .09 −.02    .11
2.   ASGS (R)  .54***    .59***   .52***    .27***    .09 −.01    .11
3.   BLPQ (R)  .55***    .57***   .52***   .33** −.04 −.17    .02
4.   BPS  .49***    .51***   .53***  .18*    .27     .19    .31
5.   EBI  .51***    .48***   .50***   .24**      .40**     .50*    .33
6.   JBQ  .55***    .50***   .45***    .34***      .38**     .58*    .23
7.   MIS  .66***    .43***  .34**    .61***       .64***      .70**      .55**
8.   PBS (R) Full  .51***    .45***   .44***    .26***     .30*    .40    .22
    Extraor. Life Form  .39***    .24** .26*   .21**    .17    .39    .07
    Precognition  .47***    .48***   .44***  .19*    .07    .26 −.09
    Psi  .41***    .38***   .41*** .06 −.01 −.29    .27
    Spiritualism  .46***    .41***   .41***  .18*    .07 −.07    .06
    Superstition  .43***     .42***   .41***     .35***      .43**    .40      .49**
    Trad. Religious Belief  .23***   .23* .25* .05    .08    .18    .05
    Witchcraft  .40***     .40***   .43*** .13    .19    .34    .08
9.   PSI  .49***     .42***   .42***   .25**    .09    .20    .02
10a. SPB-NAB (R)  .48***     .50***   .46***   .20**    .07    .05    .04
10b. SPB-TRB (R) .18**    .26**  .29* .01    .11    .24    .07
11. BDI-II  .31***     .33***   .34**    .34***      .41**    .43     .45*
12. Conformity  .20***     .40***    .45***   .21**    .13    .34    .10
13. SES  .61***     .47***    .40***    .49***     .31*    .18     .37*
Note that ‘Quasi-Believers’ and ‘Informed Believers’ are subsets of ‘Primary Believers’. AEI = Anomalous Experiences Inventory; ASGS 
(R) = Rasch-scaled Australian Sheep–Goat Scale; BLPQ (R) = Rasch-scaled Basic Limiting Principles Questionnaire; BPS = Belief in the 
Paranormal Scale; EBI = Extraordinary Beliefs Inventory; JBQ = Jinks’ Belief Questionnaire; MIS = Magical Ideation Scale; PBS-R Full 
= Paranormal Belief Scale-Revised (Full Scale); PSI = Paranormal Short Inventory; SPB-NAB = Rasch-Scaled Survey of Popular Beliefs 
(New Age Belief); Rasch-Scaled SPB-TRB = Survey of Popular Beliefs (Traditional Religious Belief); BDI-II (Beck Depression Inventory II); 
SES = Spiritual Emergency Scale (Likert scale version); *** p < .001 (two-tailed); ** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-tailed).
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corresponding rs values for each group. There were 45 signifi cant z-score 
differences out of 108 (42%). A Bonferroni correction was made by dividing 
the critical p value (α = .05) by the number of tests. The new critical p = 
.05/108 = .0005. The count was reduced to 10/108, or 9%, which is greater 
than the 5% we might expect by chance.
Even if we regard the correlations for quasi-believers and informed 
be-lievers as spurious due to small n, revised statistics are even more 
supportive of a decline. There would be 28 signifi cant z-score differences 
out of 72 (39%). A Bonferroni correction gives a new critical p = .05/72 
= .0007. The corrected count is now 11/72, or 15%, which is three times 
greater than that 5% expected by chance. We cannot dismiss the evidence of 
a decline in the number of signifi cant relationships between reality testing 
and paranormal belief as we move through the groups from primary non-
believers to primary believers.
Sample size. It is well-noted that small samples are best tested using 
nonparametric tests (Corder & Foreman 2014). We used Spearman’s rs, and 
argue that low-n and reduced variance are not likely to explain the decline 
in numbers of signifi cant correlations across believer types (see Tables 6 
and 8): First, most groups were of a suitable size, though the sub-groups 
are small (with the exception of informed skeptics; n = 87). The smallest 
group (primary believers; n = 48) has a maximum margin of error at 95% 
CI of about 14% (i.e. .98/√n; Mallard 2011), and the 95% CIs drop to 7% 
for the largest group (mixed believers; n = 180), and assuming the rank 
correlation coeffi cients should maintain their magnitude across types (under 
the assumption that the alternative hypothesis is true) only the p values 
should change (i.e. increase) as size of n changes (i.e. decreases).
Second, primary non-believers not only have the smallest SD (12.58) 
for IPO-RT (see Table 4), they also have the smallest SDs on all paranormal 
belief categories except for Primary LAD (see Table 5), yet primary non-
believers produced eight signifi cant correlations out of nine in Table 6.
Third, the mixed believers (the biggest n) not only have the largest 
SD (14.47) for IPO-RT (see Table 4), they also have the largest SDs on 
all paranormal belief categories except Primary PK (see Table 5), yet they 
produced only four signifi cant correlations out of nine in Table 6.
Other correlates of reality testing. Looking at other correlations, we 
note that IPO-RT correlates positively and signifi cantly with depression 
(BDI-II) across all believer types except quasi-believers due to low n (but 
even then, we can regard the correlation of .43 for quasi-believers as a 
replication). If there are RT defi cits, there tends to be evidence of depression 
no matter what the type.
Finally, conformity correlates signifi cantly and positively with reality 
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testing defi cits four times out of seven (though not for primary believers, 
quasi-believers, or informed believers), and spiritual emergency (SES) 
correlates signifi cantly and positively with reality testing defi cits 6 times 
out of 7.8 (These fi ndings are discussed further in the Discussion section.)
Discussion
Jinks (2012a) claimed that his fi ndings demonstrated that “most participants 
identifi ed as strong believers in a select range of anomalous topics ([i.e. 
primary] items) were less likely to support the legitimacy of equivalent 
[secondary] items, or items expressing a widely held (anomalous) explanation 
for the topic” (p. 143). Items in the fi rst class (primary items) would replicate 
the familiar propositions found in common PB questionnaires referring to, 
for example, anomalous occurrences like ESP, PK, and LAD. Items in the 
second class (secondary items) variously represent the standard anomalous 
explanations for the primary items, or they offer an alternative example of 
the primary item, or they are the primary items reworded so as to exclude 
specifi c reference to (in our example) any anomalous occurrences like ESP, 
PK, and LAD. For pragmatic (research) purposes, we aimed to investigate 
these differences, our fi rst step being to explore whether, and which, 
paranormal belief items from standard (validated) scales could be designated 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary,’ followed by the systematic development of a 
questionnaire set containing those two classes of item. Our preliminary 
evaluations of the ASGS and the BLPQ (Thalbourne 2010), the RPBS 
(Tobacyk 2004), and the SPB (Irwin & Marks 2013) indicated that such an 
undertaking was possible.
We stress that if the theoretical underpinnings of this qualitative process 
amounted to nothing more than random assignation, we could not expect 
signifi cant scoring differences between the two sets of items as proposed in 
our hypotheses. On the contrary, we did demonstrate differences between 
primary and secondary items; and these differences support our theory. 
Namely, that there are such things as primary and secondary items in extant 
scales, and these two types of items elicit different responses. We add that 
the results of H1 and H2 show that the PBIS can be used as a predictor 
of responses to primary and secondary items in the range of extant belief 
scales tested in the present study. Also, we were able to show that belief 
in secondary items is not as strong as belief in primary items, but only 
for two types of paranormal phenomena, ESP and LAD, with no strong 
evidence that the claim is true for PK due to the low item count in that 
category. We found that the primary/secondary effect occurs across believer 
types,9 and is therefore not confi ned to so-called ‘strong’ believers. We also 
found that paranormal belief was (a) not always predicted by reality testing 
222 L a n c e  S t o r m ,  K e n  D r i n k wa t e r,  A n t h o n y  L .  J i n k s
defi cits, and (b) not predicted at all by depression. We will now discuss 
these fi ndings in detail.
Primary vs. Secondary Items
In testing H1, we found primary/secondary differences for ESP and LAD, 
but we found that the difference between primary and secondary PK items 
was not in the direction hypothesized—i.e. the mean score for primary 
items was not higher than the mean score for secondary items. We pointed 
out that we were skeptical about the test validity on PK items with so few 
primary and secondary items (especially as there are only three secondary 
PK items in the whole set of 75 items), and it is clear that this bias adversely 
affected the outcomes for the test on paranormal belief. Ironically, it is 
not so much a failure of the present paper to deliver the kind of result we 
hypothesized regarding PK, as much as it is a shortcoming in scale designs 
over the past four decades for not having more PK items—after all, we can 
only work with what we have available to us. A count of the items in the 
scales used in this study (not including the JBQ) shows an overwhelming 
obsession with ESP and mental states, and a corresponding lack of interest 
in PK and physical states—we counted 72 ESP items (52% of the total), 
but only 32 PK items (23% of the total). There were 35 LAD items (25%; 
note that due to concept overlap, some items were counted more than once 
so that 107 items becomes 139 counts). This bias probably has disciplinary 
roots—it is mostly psychologists who do parapsychology (their focus tends 
to be on the ‘mental,’ and it is they who design PB scales), whereas we 
see lesser numbers of physicists and biologists doing parapsychology (their 
focus tends to be on the ‘physical,’ but they do not design PB scales). It 
is an oversight (for want of a better word) that may or may not have gone 
unnoticed by other researchers, but it is certainly not a talking point among 
parapsychologists as far as we know. Perhaps the present paper will bring 
some attention to this bias.
Informed Believers vs. Quasi-Believers
Notwithstanding the issues just raised, we can say that designation of PB 
items as either primary or secondary aided us in identifying two other 
types of paranormal believer—we have shown that there is evidence that 
respondents in our sample can hold quasi-beliefs (semi-propositional 
representations of the world superfi cially believed to be true prior to any 
truth evaluation), or they can hold informed beliefs (which indicate greater 
knowledge of the topic). For H2, we showed that quasi-believers and 
informed believers respond differently to the large pool of secondary items 
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with quasi-believers endorsing secondary items signifi cantly less often than 
informed believers.
In H2, we also looked at some inconsistent responses among quasi-
believers, confi ning our comparisons to ESP, PK, and LAD items in the 
PBIS. It would appear that quasi-belief implies no deep understanding. 
Responses are either fashioned during the test session itself, or they are 
outwardly believed in, and have existed as part of an unchallenged belief 
structure for some  time. Thus, we cannot assume with certainty that beliefs 
quantifi ed by items in a paranormal questionnaire are stable constructs, or 
are well-formed and logically consistent, yet these are the very assumptions 
that are often being made by researchers.
Reality Testing Defi cits and Depression
In H3, we showed that scoring on the reality testing defi cits measure (IPO-
RT) is related to paranormal belief. Table 8 shows that nine PB scales, and 
nine PB sub-scales, correlate signifi cantly with IPO-RT. While these results 
support (and even replicate) those of Dagnall et al. (2010), Drinkwater et al. 
(2012), Irwin (2004), Irwin, Dagnall, and Drinkwater (2015), etc., we argue 
that the results may be misleading because they have been generalized to all 
paranormal believers. We cannot assume that what appears true for a type is 
true for a sub-type, and we showed this to be the case when we ran tests on 
the three believer types: primary believers, quasi-believers, and informed 
believers. As Table 8 also shows, while scoring on conventional PB scales 
does not reliably predict reality testing defi cits for primary believers, and 
even mixed belief on a few occasions, it does for primary non-believers, 
including informed skeptics.
In H3, we also showed that depression was not related to paranormal 
belief, and there were no signifi cant differences between believer types. 
These results, supported by the recent fi ndings of Billows and Storm 
(2015a, 2016), are a move away from the mixed results of the past, toward 
the likelihood that PB does not predict depression, and vice versa.
The discriminant functions analysis produced a model that successfully 
identifi ed membership for primary non-believers and mixed believers, but it 
also revealed that group membership for primary believers is not predicted 
by scores on the reality testing measure. While the model would prefer to 
classify this type as mixed believers (see Table 7), it seems not to distinguish 
how the two groups are constructed—primary believers have to believe in 
all 10 primary items in the PBIS; mixed believers do not. We suggest this is 
the kind of problem that arises in conventional paranormal belief testing—
special cases are not discerned, yet these may be the very cases to whom 
past trends and correlations reported in the literature do not apply.
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Finally, we note (post hoc) that RT defi cits correlated positively and 
signifi cantly with depression (BDI-II) across all believer types—where 
there are RT defi cits there tends to be evidence of depression. Space 
does not permit an attempted explanation of the causality underlying this 
relationship but, given our other fi ndings, we cannot suggest at this stage 
that PB is instrumental in this relationship.
Though also post hoc, conformity and spiritual emergency appear to 
correlate signifi cantly and positively with reality testing defi cits across most 
PB groups (though for conformity, we exclude all primary believers). For 
the SES, we do note that it is a predictor of a number of psychosis symptoms 
and indicators, but not depression, and the SES does contain a number of 
paranormal items (Goretzki, Storm, & Thalbourne 2014). Therefore, while 
we suggest some fi ndings of PB research may be misleading, or misrepresent 
subsets of paranormal believers, we naturally have reservations about 
applying that assumption to all PB research as far as some defi cits and 
dysfunctions are concerned. We plan to investigate the PB/SES relationship 
in more detail in a later study.
Conclusions
In the present study, we demonstrated the tendency for the number of 
signifi cant PB/IPO-RT correlations to decrease across believer types. 
We found no evidence of signifi cant correlations of PB with depression 
(as measured on the BDI-II). Some paranormal beliefs may not be mere 
expressions of a cultural trend, or fanciful or popular notions that embody 
contradictions evident in, for example, scoring differences between 
primary and secondary items. It may be the case that an informed or 
suffi ciently informed subset of paranormal believers, albeit small, has a 
genuine understanding of the phenomena not entirely (if at all) governed 
or brought about by some number of defi cits, dysfunctions, or disorders. 
Conventional procedures do not identify this type, possibly because the 
designers do not concede its likelihood. We do not argue that there is 
anything fundamentally at fault with the basic constructs investigated in 
the present study—it is merely our suggestion that there may be subtle 
differences among paranormal believers, especially those who are high-
scoring, but investigators do not seek out those differences. As Jinks (2012a) 
has said “. . . items in paranormal and anomalous belief questionnaires are 
not necessarily homogenous devices successfully extracting ‘informed’ 
beliefs possessing a rational basis” (p. 148). Our fi ndings suggest that if 
researchers continue to make generalizations from samples and measures 
that are clearly heterogeneous, gains will be slow in our understanding of 
paranormal belief.
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Notes
1 PB scales, such as Thalbourne’s (1995) Australian Sheep–Goat Scale, 
and Tobacyk’s (2004) Revised Paranormal Belief Scale, are often used 
to identify paranormal believers and disbelievers (i.e. ‘sheep’ and ‘goats,’ 
respectively—see Schmeidler 1945).
2  A person’s informed belief itself does not necessarily have to be legitimate. 
For example, an individual might possess an informed belief, gleaned 
through intensive research, regarding the legitimacy of psi. Nevertheless, 
the veracity of psi effects remains controversial, and might not be 
legitimate. Similarly, another person’s belief in psi could be a quasi-belief 
if it was accepted blindly without question.
3 Irwin (2015), citing an example from Quine and Ullian (1970), has recently 
made a similar argument about belief formation and maintenance.
4  Top-down purifi cation refers to a set of Rasch-scaling procedures that 
identify and remedy differential item functioning in questionnaires (i.e. 
response biases related to extraneous variables such as respondents’ age, 
gender, or even culture).
5  The Spiritual Emergency Scale (SES) (Goretzki, Storm, & Thalbourne 
2014) was also administered, for purposes to be explained in a future 
article.
6  Jinks (2012a) does not use the term primary believer. His term ‘quasi-
believer’ refers to a respondent who holds a ‘strong’ belief (i.e. “very 
probably” or “defi nitely”) in a given primary item, but does not endorse 
the relevant secondary item(s). Our term ‘primary believer’ is provisional 
and refers to a respondent who expresses agreement to all ten primary 
items—he/she is either a quasi-believer or an informed believer depending 
on his/her responses to the secondary items in the PBIS.
7  Note that by Jinks’ (2012a:134) criteria, assignment to primary belief 
status was less restricted, in accordance with categories consisting of 
no more than a few items. For example, in the “Nostradamus” category, 
there were 49 “quasi-believers” and only 2 “informed believers” (i.e. 
51 primary believers), whereas in the “Ghosts” category there were 27 
“quasi-believers” and 7 “informed believers” (i.e. 34 primary believers).
8 Two versions of the 30-item Spiritual Emergency Scale were 
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administered—the forced-choice (‘Yes’/‘No’) version, and a fi ve-point 
Likert-scale version (‘Never’ to ‘Very Often’). These two scales correlate 
signifi cantly and the relationship is strong, r(341) = .76, p < .001. The 
Likert scale version is used in Table 8. We note that both versions do 
not correlate with depression, suggesting that spiritual emergency is 
independent of depression.
9 Of course, it was always expected that PB mean scores on the 75 
remaining items would increase across believer types which were defi ned 
by scores on the PBIS, items of which were drawn from the same pool 
as the 75 items. Therefore, we might logically expect mean PB scores 
to increase signifi cantly across believer categories. Nevertheless, these 
between-group differences must be proven statistically—we cannot make 
scientifi c statements prior to testing, which is the only way to determine 
the sizes of the main effects and interaction effect, and confi rm (or not) 
the theoretical premise we are trying to demonstrate.
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APPENDIX A
Paranormal Belief Informedness Scale (20 Items): 
Items, Factor Loadings & Extraction Communalities
Item Code Item wording (ESP, PK, and/or LAD) P/R * Loadings Communalities
1 ebi10 Psychics possess a mysterious ability to know things about a 
person’s past and future. (ESP) P .904 .817
2 ebi19 There is such a thing as extrasensory perception. (ESP) P .895 .802
3 ebi27 There is such a thing as telepathy (communication directly 
from mind to mind). (ESP) P .892 .795
4 bps1 I believe psychic phenomena are real and should become a 
part of psychology and be studied scientifically. (ESP/PK/LAD) S .874 .763
5 psi13 Contrary to scientific belief, some people can make contact 
with dead people. (PK/LAD) S .872 .760
6 psi1 It is probably true that some people can predict the future 
quite accurately. (ESP) P .870 .757
7 ebi23 Some people have a mysterious ability to accurately predict 
such things as natural disasters, election results, political 
assassinations, etc. (ESP)
S .865 .748
8 pbs21 Some psychics can accurately predict the future. (ESP) P .864 .747
9 ebi11 The spirits of people who have died can sometimes 
communicate with the living. (LAD) S .863 .744
10 bps11 Some individuals are able to levitate (lift objects) through 
mysterious mental forces. (PK) S .862 .743
11 bps8 Through psychic individuals it is possible to communicate with 
the dead. (LAD) P .860 .739
12 pbs26 Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future. 
(ESP) S .858 .737
13 bps12 I believe that many special persons throughout the world have 
the ability to predict the future. (ESP) P .858 .737
14 ebi1 There is a real phenomenon known as psychokinesis (the 
ability to move objects by the power of the mind). (PK) P .858 .736
15 blpq24 I believe that psychic healing occurs. (PK) P .852 .725
16 psi5 In spite of the laws of science, some people can use their 
psychic powers to make objects move. (PK) P .851 .724
17 pbs16 A person’s thoughts can influence the movement of a physical 
object. (PK) S .848 .720
18 ebi12 There is such a thing as astral projection (where the body 
remains behind while the spirit travels). (LAD) S .847 .717
19 ebi25 There is such a thing as levitation (raising the body through 
mental power). (PK) S .841 .708
20 blpq14 I believe some people can contact spirits of the dead. (LAD) S .828 .685
* P = Primary item, S = Secondary item
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